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I. Introduction 
In Brown v. Allen,1 Justice Robert Jackson famously declared 
of the Supreme Court “[w]e are not final because we are infallible, 
but we are infallible only because we are final.”2 The Supreme 
Court exercised its power of finality in that case by limiting the 
collateral review accorded to state court decisions by denying 
post-conviction relief to prisoners challenging the 
constitutionality of their convictions.3 Despite Justice Jackson’s 
characterization of the Supreme Court’s finality, however, its 
Brown decision was subsequently abrogated by amendments to 
28 U.S.C. § 2254, as part of Congress’s revisions to the federal 
courts’ ability to collaterally review both federal and state 
convictions in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 
of 1996 (“AEDPA”).4 Balancing the interests of finality and 
fallibility, however, remains the fundamental principle 
underlying appellate review in the American legal system.5  
People of good faith want to get it right. They want justice. 
From time to time, Americans have focused their attention on 
                                                                                                     
 1. 344 U.S. 443 (1953) superseded by statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2012), as 
recognized in O’Brien v. Dubois, 145 F.3d 16 (1st Cir. 1998). 
 2. Id. at 540 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
 3. See O’Brien, 145 F.3d at 20 (“Thus, even if lower federal court decisions 
support the petitioner’s position or adumbrate the emergence of a rule favorable 
to him, the writ cannot issue unless the state court decision contravenes, or 
involves an unreasonable application of, extant Supreme Court jurisprudence.”).  
 4. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2012); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 402–
13 (2000) (acknowledging that the Brown decision was superseded by statute). 
See generally Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. 
No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (claiming a purpose of “deter[ing] terrorism, 
provid[ing] justice for victims, [and] provid[ing] for an effective death penalty”). 
 5. See Joseph M. Giarratano, Essay, “To the Best of Our Knowledge, We 
Have Never Been Wrong”: Fallibility vs. Finality in Capital Punishment, 100 
YALE L.J. 1005, 1006 (1991) (discussing the fundamental balance between 
wanted fairness and wanting a final decision). 
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cases in which we fear our legal system has gotten it wrong. 
Whether it is the case of Adnan Syed made famous in Sarah 
Koenig’s Serial podcast,6 or the case of Joseph Giarratano (which 
anti-death penalty activists have raised as a rallying cry),7 our 
attention keeps being drawn towards the re-examination of 
questionable cases. The proper balance between finality and 
accuracy is not an easy one to achieve. 
Absent divine intervention, human beings cannot achieve 
metaphysical infallibility. Any serious attempt to even approach 
infallibility in the results of our criminal justice system would 
require an open-ended commitment to further review trial court 
decisions as many times as necessary to eliminate any question 
that could ever be raised, now and into the indefinite future. 
There could never be a final decision. If it is anathema in any just 
legal system to execute an even possibly innocent person, then 
such an open-ended system may be necessary. 
By contrast, any attempt to settle on a final, ultimate 
resolution of a defendant’s guilt would necessitate cutting off all 
further attempts to raise new facts or arguments questioning 
that decision. One is hard-pressed to imagine any combination of 
confessions, eye-witness identifications, and forensic evidence 
that cannot be called into doubt. In fact, the cases where just 
such evidence has been called into doubt are legion.8 Any 
declaration that we will review a defendant’s guilt no more 
simply asserts that we have reviewed such questions enough. 
This begs the question: Enough for what purpose? 
The problem is that we do not all agree on what it means to 
be “innocent” or “guilty.” Is guilt an objective truth or a 
procedural conclusion? If it is an objective truth, no human-run 
                                                                                                     
 6. See Sarah Koenig, Serial, WBEZ CHICAGO (Fall 2014) (discussing the 
evidence, whether admitted in trial or not, in the case of Adnan Syed’s 
conviction for the murder of Hae Min Lee). 
 7. B. Drummond Ayres, Jr., Virginia Governor Blocks an Execution, N.Y. 
TIMES (Feb. 20, 1991), http://www.nytimes.com/1991/02/20/us/virginia-governor-
blocks-an-execution.html (last visited Sept. 21, 2016) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 8. See WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS INVOLVING UNVALIDATED OR IMPROPER 
FORENSIC SCIENCE THAT WERE LATER OVERTURNED THROUGH DNA TESTING, 
INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/ 
02/DNA_Exonerations_Forensic_Science.pdf (collecting cases where a conviction 
was based on wrongful forensic evidence). 
1246 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1243 (2016) 
system can ever reach a final, definitive answer. If it is a 
procedural conclusion, then metaphysical certainty is impossible. 
One of the premises underlying the American legal system 
of trials and appeals is that while we cannot achieve 
metaphysical certainty of the accuracy of the results reached by 
our courts, we can achieve a sufficient level of trust in the 
results if we carefully guard the inputs and process by which we 
reach those results. The function of the appeal is not to offer the 
defendant a second chance to determine the question of his 
guilt, but a chance to call the process by which his guilt was 
determined into doubt. To achieve finality, the American legal 
system attempts to enforce certain limits on perpetual appeals, 
though it leaves open the possibility of an escape hatch to 
prevent everyone’s worst nightmare—the execution of an 
actually innocent person. 
An interesting comparison to the American legal system’s 
attempt to impose an imperfect finality is the Talmud’s criminal 
justice system, which imposes no deadline on a condemned 
defendant’s ability to raise new questions concerning his guilt.9 
One feature of the Talmud—Judaism’s compendium of religious 
and civil law, rabbinic tradition, and philosophy—is its striving 
to know the essence of a thing.10 The Talmud’s “concern for 
precise definitions” manifests itself in explorations of what 
constitutes an object’s or an obligation’s “essence and which [of 
its features] are dispensable.”11 According to the Talmud, 
earthly judges are not merely acting on their own behalf, but are 
representatives of G-d,12 and G-d’s presence is in their 
                                                                                                     
 9. See infra Section III.B (discussing the Talmud’s open-ended post-
conviction review process). 
 10. See Adam Kirsch, What Happens When the Talmud Asks, ‘What If?’, 
TABLET (Jan. 14, 2014), http://www.tabletmag.com/jewish-life-and-
religion/159223/daf-yomi-66 (last visited Sept. 21, 2016) (describing the function 
of the remote speculations within the Talmud as provocation to consider 
definitions and essences of things) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 11. Adam Kirsch, How the Talmud Maps Behavior by Exploring 
Definitions, Not Listing Rules, TABLET (June 18, 2013) http://www. 
tabletmag.com/jewish-life-and-religion/135210/daf-yomi-38 (last visited Sept. 21, 
2016) [hereinafter Kirsch, How the Talmud Maps Behavior] (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 12. Beyond refraining from writing or uttering the formal or even informal 
names of G-d, many Jews hyphenate the word itself. When writing for myself, 
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judgment.13 Thus, determining whether a condemned prisoner is 
actually innocent or guilty is not a mere procedural question, but 
a search for divine truth. Innocence and guilt are metaphysical 
states of being. G-d commands: “An innocent person you shall not 
slay.”14 The Talmud, thus, bends over backwards to avoid 
carrying out capital punishment, despite its exhaustive treatment 
of the subject and deceptively draconian tone.15 Finality of 
judgment is sacrificed to ensure that no inaccurate judgment is 
carried out. 
These competing ideas between guilt and innocence as states 
of being or conclusions derived from a valid, judicial process are 
reflected in a debate that has engaged legal scholars—from the 
Talmudic rabbis to the United States Supreme Court—for more 
than a thousand years.16 Importantly, recognizing the difference 
between guilt and innocence as objective truths and guilt and 
innocence as legal conclusions explains how Justice John Paul 
Stevens and Justice Antonin Scalia managed to talk past each 
other in In re Davis,17 one of the Supreme Court’s treatments of 
the subject of “actual innocence.” When Scalia’s critics attributed 
to him the position that “executing even innocents doesn’t violate 
the Constitution,”18 they confused the two different views about 
what it means to be “innocent.” This philosophical nuance is 
meaningless to the horrifying prospect that a person may have 
been wrongfully put to death by the American legal system. But 
understanding the difference between these competing definitions 
of “innocence” is essential to understanding Justice Scalia’s and 
Justice Stevens’s disagreement in In re Davis.  
                                                                                                     
and not directly quoting others whose practices may differ, I will keep to that 
practice. 
 13. Haim Shapira, “For the Judgment is God’s”: Human Judgment and 
Divine Justice in the Hebrew Bible and in Jewish Tradition, 27 J.L. & REL. 273, 
294–300 (2011–12). 
 14. Exodus 23:7. 
 15. See infra Section III.B (discussing the Talmud’s criminal justice 
system). 
 16. See infra Section IV (discussing the Talmud’s criminal justice debates). 
 17. 557 U.S. 952 (2009). 
 18. Dahlia Lithwick, How the Innocent End up on Death Row, TAMPA BAY 
TIMES (Sept. 4, 2014), http://www.tampabay.com/news/nation/how-the-innocent-
end-up-on-death-row/2196162 (last visited Sept. 21, 2016) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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This thousand-year-old argument continued to stymie the 
Supreme Court through its 2015 term.19 Justice Breyer argued 
that the imposition of the death penalty is unconstitutionally 
cruel because of its “serious unreliability.”20 He cited research 
“estimat[ing] that about 4% of those sentenced to death are 
actually innocent.”21 Justice Scalia responded that the petitioners 
before the Court were “afforded counsel and tried before a jury of 
their peers” and thus “duly convicted and sentenced.”22  
The different ways in which the Talmud’s legal system and 
the American legal system attempt to balance the competing 
interests in accuracy and finality spotlight these different 
conceptions of innocence and guilt. A system that prizes accuracy 
above all, as the Talmud does in attempting to implement a 
divinely-inspired system of ultimate justice, dispenses with 
finality to ensure it never executes an innocent man. Yet a 
system that attempts to maintain some element of finality in its 
judgments, as the American legal system does, can still claim 
never to have executed an innocent person—if you accept that 
“guilt” is a legal determination, not an objective truth. The proper 
balance between finality and accuracy plagued the rabbis of the 
Talmud and continues to plague the Justices of the United States 
Supreme Court.  
As centuries of Talmud scholars have discovered, a good 
Talmudic debate can be both a useful way to derive a difficult 
answer and an enjoyable intellectual exercise for its own sake.23 
This Article will present one such Talmudic debate—on the 
subject of finality in the criminal justice system’s attempt to 
determine a condemned prisoner’s guilt or innocence—and show 
that this same debate was carried out in almost identical terms 
by the United States Supreme Court in In re Davis. Part II will 
introduce readers to the Talmud, its structure, and its distinctive 
                                                                                                     
 19. See Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2736–38 (2015) (debating the 
merits of enforcing the death penalty). 
 20. Id. at 2756 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 21. Id. at 2758 (citation omitted). 
 22. Id. at 2746–47 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 23. See David A Frank, Arguing with God, Talmudic Discourse, and the 
Jewish Countermodel: Implications for the Study of Argumentation, 41 
ARGUMENTATION AND ADVOCACY 71, 80–83 (2004) (describing the historical role 
of Talmudic debate in Jewish discourse).  
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method of debate and analysis. Part III will compare the 
American and Talmudic criminal justice systems, highlighting 
the differences in available avenues for appellate review under 
the Talmud and American law. Part IV will relate the debate in 
the Talmud between Rav Acha bar Huna and Rav Sheishess over 
what to do when a member of the court raises a new argument to 
acquit a condemned prisoner, but is struck mute before being able 
to state his argument, and will compare this debate with the one 
between Justice Stevens and Justice Scalia over whether a 
condemned prisoner who has exhausted his direct and collateral 
appeals may raise a new claim of actual innocence. Part V will 
further discuss the case of Troy Davis, the prisoner whose matter 
was the subject of Justice Stevens’s and Justice Scalia’s debate. 
Part VI will offer a conclusion about the meaning of guilt, 
innocence, and finality in systems of divine and human justice. 
Conceding my amateur status as a Talmud scholar, I make 
no claims of understanding or conveying the entirety of the 
Talmud’s treatment of the procedures and principles to be applied 
in criminal trials or appeals. As discussed below, conveying the 
entirety of the Talmud’s thought on any subject is a near 
impossibility for even the most learned Talmud scholar. My 
purpose in this essay is to highlight the similarity between one 
particular Talmudic debate on the question of finality of criminal 
judgments and an on-going debate amongst the Justices of the 
United States Supreme Court on the same subject. Any debate 
that continues in the same form for more than a thousand years 
deserves our attention. 
II. A Brief Introduction to the Talmud 
Before I continue, a little explanation about the Talmud is in 
order, as it has been remarked, “The Talmud is . . . a nightmare 
for the uninitiated.”24 Worse, a little knowledge is a completely 
                                                                                                     
 24. See Irene Merker Rosenberg & Yale L. Rosenberg, In the Beginning: 
The Talmudic Rule Against Self Incrimination, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 955, 972–73 
(1988) [hereinafter Rosenberg, In the Beginning] (“There is neither table of 
contents nor index, and it is written in Hebrew and Aramaic freely intermixed. 
It has no vowels and no punctuation. The language is, on its face, terse and 
cryptic, presupposing broad and deep knowledge of the totality.”). 
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baffling thing. Although the Talmud is divided into sixty sections, 
called tractates, named for their purported areas of focus (e.g., 
“Tractate Sanhedrin” refers to the courts (sanhedrin)), the 
discussions found within each tractate wander in an almost 
stream of consciousness fashion to a seeming infinite series of 
digressions—“[y]ou [will] seldom find subjects in the place where 
you expect them.”25 In the tractate ostensibly devoted to the rules 
of regarding the observance of the Jewish High Holiday of Yom 
Kippur, you will find significant information regarding which 
types of structures require the posting of a mezuzah on the 
door.26 A tractate regarding the procedures for verifying the time 
of the New Moon commencing the High Holiday of Rosh Hashana 
provides the maxim that “a witness cannot act as a judge” and 
then proceeds to discuss whether such rule only applies in capital 
cases.27 Because of this style of discussion and digression, “it is 
impossible to find all conceptually related materials on any given 
issue, unless, of course, one is already familiar with and 
understands the entire Talmud.”28 Another writer put it this way: 
“[T]he Talmud itself is so unpredictably structured that it is 
almost unusable as a practical legal guide. In order to know 
where to look for a given subject, you’d have to know the entire 
Talmud in advance.”29  
                                                                                                     
 25. See Kirsch, How the Talmud Maps Behavior, supra note 11 (noting the 
confusing structure of the Talmud and how within one chapter the focus can 
shift to different subjects). 
 26. See Adam Kirsch, The Talmud Says God Can’t Protect Jews From 
Persecution; They Must Take Precautions, TABLET (Nov. 26, 2013), 
http://www.tabletmag.com/jewish-life-and-religion/154044/daf-yomi-60 (last 
visited Sept. 21, 2016) [hereinafter Kirsch, The Talmud Says God Can’t Protect 
Jews From Persecution] (“The connection with the ostensible subject of the 
tractate, as often happens in the Talmud, is so fleeting that if you blinked you 
might miss it.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 27. See Adam Kirsch, Talmudic Rabbis Debate the Practice of the Law 
Versus the Intention Behind It, TABLET (June 10, 2014), http://www.tablet 
mag.com/jewish-life-and-religion/175313/daf-yomi-85 (last visited Sept. 21, 
2016) (explaining that a witness cannot also be a judge because then the judge 
will not be able to exonerate the accused and follow the principal of innocent 
until proven guilty that all judges are to follow) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). 
 28. Rosenberg, In the Beginning, supra note 24, at 972. 
 29. Kirsch, The Talmud Says God Can’t Protect Jews From Persecution, 
supra note 26. 
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But the Talmud is more than a compilation of Jewish law. “If 
the Bible is the cornerstone of Judaism, then the Talmud is the 
central pillar, soaring up from the foundations and supporting 
the entire spiritual and intellectual edifice.”30 “Indeed, at least 
from the perspective of traditional Judaism, to divine original 
intent with respect to any law, one must view the Bible and the 
Talmud as an indivisible partnership.”31 
According to Jewish tradition, G-d personally delivered to 
Moses at Mount Sinai both the written Law set forth in the 
Torah32 and the oral Law that was then passed down from Moses 
and on through his rabbinic successors in each generation.33 
Debates about the oral and written Law have occupied the Jewish 
people from late Biblical times through the modern day. The 
Talmud represents “the primary source” of Jewish law, though 
far from the final and definitive source.34 
                                                                                                     
 30. ADIN STEINSALTZ, THE ESSENTIAL TALMUD 3 (Chaya Galai trans., Basic 
Books 2006). 
 31. Irene Merker Rosenberg & Yale L. Rosenberg, Of God’s Mercy and the 
Four Biblical Methods of Capital Punishment: Stoning, Burning, Beheading, 
and Strangulation, 78 TUL. L. REV. 1169, 1175–76 (2004) [hereinafter 
Rosenberg, Of God’s Mercy] (explaining that in order to understand the biblical 
death penalty, one must understand the Talmud). 
 32. The Torah contains the Five Books of Moses, traditionally given to the 
Children of Israel by G-d at Sinai, during their exodus from Egypt. Collectively, 
the Torah, the Writings, and the Prophets constitute the Jewish Bible, which is 
known by the acronym formed by the Hebrew names for each section (Torah + 
Nevi’im + Ketuvim = Tanach). 
 33. See Martin Pritikin, The Value of Talmud Study to Modern Legal 
Education, 21 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 351, 352 (2007) (using cases from the 
Talmud to explain its relevance to modern legal thought); Rosenberg, Of God’s 
Mercy, supra note 31, at 1175 n.16 (“If we do not trust [the Sages’] 
interpretation, we will be unable to fully understand the [commandments]. Just 
as we received the Written Torah from our ancestors, so did we receive its oral 
interpretation.” (quoting YEHUDA NACHSHONI, STUDIES IN THE WEEKLY 
PARASHAH, SH’MOS 491 (Shmuel Himelstein trans., 1998) (citations omitted))); 
see also Rosenberg, In the Beginning, supra note 24, at 967 n.47 (discussing 
further the history of the oral and written Law in Jewish tradition and 
scholarship). 
 34. STEINSALTZ, supra note 30, at 4. Over the generations, Jewish scholars 
have continued to comment on and add their own gloss to the never-ending 
debate. Subsequent attempts to distill Jewish law and explain the Talmud 
continued from the Twelfth Century Mishneh Torah of Moses Maimonides to the 
legal opinions authored by leading rabbis to this day (responsa). See Pritikin, 
supra note 33, at 355–57 (detailing the sources of Jewish law). 
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The Talmud consists of two parts. The Mishnah, “a book of 
halakha (law) written in Hebrew,” and the Gemara, “a summary 
of discussion and elucidations of the Mishnah written in Aramaic-
Hebrew.”35 The Mishnah was compiled between 30 B.C.E. and 
200 C.E. and attempts to set forth the “terse, black-letter law” 
derived from the “unbroken chain” of the oral Law transmitted 
from the time of Moses.36 The word “Mishnah” derives from the 
verb root meaning “to repeat.”37 The Gemara was compiled 
between 200 C.E. and 500 C.E. and consists of rabbinic debates 
about the meaning and sources of the law, with reference to 
Biblical text, oral tradition, and Jewish folklore.38 The word 
“Gemara” means “learning” or “scholarship” in Aramaic and 
“completion” in Hebrew.39 “Whereas the Mishnah’s mission is to 
lay out the law, the Gemara’s primary function is ‘to serve . . . as 
a vehicle of theoretical explication [of the law].”40 The title 
“Rabbi” (or its variants “Rav” or “Rabban”), given to the scholars 
quoted in the Talmud, derives from the word for teacher or 
master.41 
The Talmud as it comes to us today is in large measure the 
result of editing, compilation, and gloss added by the Eleventh 
Century Rabbi Shlomo Yitzchaki (known by the acroynym 
“Rashi”).42 Rashi’s place as “the greatest commentator on the 
Talmud” is “universally acknowledged,” and “[a]lmost all 
Talmudic commentators after the time of Rashi relate to his 
                                                                                                     
 35. STEINSALTZ, supra note 30, at 3. 
 36. Id. at 10, 57–62; see also Pritikin, supra note 33, at 353 (providing a 
basic explanation of the Mishna); Rosenberg, Of God’s Mercy, supra note 31, at 
1175 (discussing biblical death penalties). 
 37. Rosenberg, In the Beginning, supra note 24, at 968 n.48. 
 38. See STEINSALTZ, supra note 30, at 10; Rosenberg, Of God’s Mercy, supra 
note 31, at 1175 (“The Mishnah, which generally states terse, black-letter law, 
was redacted circa 200 C.E.; the far lengthier Gemara, which is an 
extraordinary commentary consisting largely of rabbinic debates invoking 
biblical, mishnaic, and midrashic sources, was redacted some three centuries 
later.”). 
 39. Rosenberg, In the Beginning, supra note 24, at 969 n.49. 
 40. Rosenberg, Of God’s Mercy, supra note 31, at 1188 (quoting ADIN 
STEINSALTZ, THE STRIFE OF THE SPIRIT 80 (1988)). 
 41. PETER SCHAFER, THE HISTORY OF THE JEWS IN THE GRECO-ROMAN WORLD 
133 (2003). 
 42. STEINSALTZ, supra note 30, at 116.  
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commentary, in some way disagreeing with it, defending it, 
interpreting it, or clarifying it.”43 Because of the respect given to 
his views, Rashi’s commentaries are included alongside the 
Talmud’s text, set apart in special “Rashi script.”44 
A passage in the Talmud will begin with a statement of the 
law from the Mishnah, followed by a rabbinic debate in the 
Gemara posing questions about the Mishnah’s assertion, typically 
questioning the source for the Mishnah’s conclusion, challenging 
its reasoning, or seeking to clarify its meaning through the use of 
hypothetical scenarios.45 As readers will discover when this 
Article explores one such rabbinic debate concerning finality in 
criminal jurisprudence, that these hypotheticals may stray from 
the legal point under consideration or propose absurd situations 
does not undercut the Talmud’s elucidation of the law, but rather 
serves to support the entire structure. “The Gemara may, after a 
detour, return to the prior topic, or it may finish a topic with 
certain questions left unresolved. But no matter what twists and 
turns the Gemara takes, the job of the student is to look for 
logical consistency throughout.”46 As should be familiar to any 
American law student practiced in the art of Socratic instruction, 
“[a]s new sources or arguments are introduced, the [Talmud 
reader] may be forced to revisit and revise initial assumptions 
about the scenario, the rule, or the underlying principles that 
connect them.”47 
For example, if in the Torah G-d commands the Jewish 
people that on the Sabbath they are to “perform no labor,”48 the 
Talmud attempts to answer the question of what constitutes 
performing labor. Such a question may appear simple. One oral 
tradition relies on the idea that G-d’s command to observe the 
Sabbath as a day of rest commemorated G-d’s cessation of labor 
                                                                                                     
 43. Id. at 119.  
 44. Id. at 116–19.  
 45. See Pritikin, supra note 33, at 358 (comparing Mishna argument to 
Gemara argument). 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at 351, 361 (“Often, a mishna will employ only a few words to 
represent a complicated factual scenario. Part of the job of the student is to try 
to determine what that scenario is. Logic, creativity, and linguistic analysis are 
all crucial ingredients to success in this endeavor.”). 
 48. Exodus 20:8–11. 
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at the completion of creating the universe, and thus “labor” 
should constitute creative actions.49 This generalized approach 
does not suffice, however, because “no single definition could 
cover all the complex problems likely to develop.”50 The Mishnah 
can compile a list of forbidden actions (based upon the thirty-nine 
separate, basic labors said to be necessary for the construction of 
the Tabernacle in the wilderness—something the Torah 
specifically forbids the Jewish people from doing on the Sabbath) 
but the commentary in the Gemara is necessary to derive from 
this list the types of labors “similar in essence, although differing 
in detail,” which are then likewise forbidden.51 If “carrying” is 
forbidden, is “transporting saliva in one’s mouth” considered 
“carrying”?52 To love such a question is to love the Talmud. 
While the Talmud contains a myriad of important rules and 
regulations governing every aspect of an observant Jew’s life, it 
also displays an abiding “interest in theoretical argument, even 
when no practical issue is at stake.”53  
Voicing doubts is not only legitimate in the Talmud, it is 
essential to study. To a certain degree, the rule is that any 
type of query is permissible and even desirable; the more the 
merrier. No inquiry is regarded as unfair or incorrect as long 
as it pertains to the issue and can cast light on some aspect of 
it.54  
                                                                                                     
 49. See STEINSALTZ, supra note 30, at 148 (“Just as God ceased from His 
labor—creation of the world—on the Sabbath, so the children of Israel are called 
upon to refrain from creative work on this day.”). 
 50. Id. at 148–49. 
 51. See id. at 149 (discussing the complex subcategories derived from the 
thirty-nine basic labors). For a more thorough example of the Talmud’s 
analytical approach, see Pritikin, supra note 33, at 365–85. The fact that 
Pritikin titles step six of his eight-step illustration of the Talmud’s reasoning 
process “A Proposed Solution to the Flaw in the Alternative Resolution” should 
tell readers something about the complexity of Talmudic analysis. This should 
not daunt American lawyers who are woefully familiar with pleadings such as 
Sur-Replies to the Second Cross-Motion for Reconsideration of the District 
Court’s Order Denying Rehearing. 
 52. Kirsch, What Happens When the Talmud Asks, ‘What If?’, supra note 
10. 
 53. Kirsch, The Talmud Says God Can’t Protect Jews From Persecution, 
supra note 26. 
 54. STEINSALTZ, supra note 30, at 8. 
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“[I]t is the debates themselves, rather than the rules 
propounded, that are the glory of the Talmud.”55 Even G-d is said 
to enjoy a good Talmudic debate and does not mind losing.56 
In fact, the Talmud’s entire treatment of the procedures and 
safeguards required before condemning a criminal to death, 
reviewing his sentence, and carrying out the punishment 
constitutes a giant advisory opinion. The Talmud recognizes that 
capital cases can only properly be tried while there is a Great 
Sanhedrin sitting in the Temple in Jerusalem that was destroyed 
by the Romans in 70 C.E.57 The Talmud’s compilers did not let 
the hypothetical nature of many of their questions stop them 
from addressing them in great detail. Deriving the correct answer 
was its own reward and half the fun.58 All of us who have been 
first-year law students should appreciate that. 
                                                                                                     
 55. Rosenberg, In the Beginning, supra note 24, at 969–70. 
 56. In Bava Metzia 59b, the Talmud relates a much-loved story about 
Rabbi Eliezer’s lone defense of his position regarding the ritual purity of an oven 
(“The Oven of Akhnai”) against an unnamed majority of opposing rabbis. Rabbi 
Eliezer appeals for signs from G-d to show support for his position, which G-d 
provides by way of several miracles—a carob tree is uprooted, the waters of a 
canal run backwards, the walls of the hall lean. Id. Finally, a voice from Heaven 
itself proclaims support for Rabbi Eliezer. Id. The other rabbis, astoundingly, 
reject this Heavenly support for Rabbi Eliezer, citing Deuteronomy 30:12 for the 
proposition that the Law “is not in Heaven”—meaning that G-d already set forth 
the Law and presented it to Moses and his rabbinic successors, to whom G-d 
gave authority to decide such matters by majority. Id. The Talmud’s coda to this 
story relates Rabbi Nassan’s occasion to meet the prophet Elijah who tells Rabbi 
Nassan that G-d’s reaction to the rabbis’ refutation of his support for Rabbi 
Eliezer was one of joy: G-d “was laughing and saying my children have prevailed 
over Me, My children have prevailed over Me.” Id. Generations of Talmud 
scholars have taken heart from this story as encouragement to leave no 
argument unchallenged. See Stephen J. Werber, The Essence of Talmudic Law 
and Thought by Samuel N. Hoenig, 17 J.L & REL. 297, 300 (2002) (“It is man, 
and man’s intelligence and free will, that rules.”); Daniel J.H. Greenwood, 
Akhnai, 1997 UTAH L. REV. 309, 342–44 (1997) (explaining how the Talmud 
story of Eliezer defeating G-d in argument shows that to be called 
argumentative in the Talmud is to be praised). 
 57. Sanhedrin 52b. See also Shabbos 15a (acknowledging the Great 
Sanhedrin’s abstention from hearing capital cases in exile); Rosenberg, Of God’s 
Mercy, supra note 31, at 1176 n.21 (describing the destruction of the Temple and 
the various theories on when the Temple ceased to hold hearings). 
 58. Kirsch, The Talmud Says God Can’t Protect Jews From Persecution, 
supra note 26, describes the Talmud’s attention to the question of how a Temple 
High Priest would arrange to have a second wife ready, just in case his original 
wife died immediately before the Jewish holiday of Yom Kippur. Because certain 
rituals must be performed by the High Priest—and only the High Priest—in 
1256 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1243 (2016) 
Literary critic Adam Kirsch, writing about his experience 
engaging in the tradition of Daf Yomi (reading and studying a 
page of the Talmud a day), observes that the Talmud’s attention 
to hypothetical questions is not merely “academic speculation[]”: 
I’ve found it useful, in the course of reading Daf Yomi, to think 
of these kinds of questions as the rabbis’ indirect way of asking 
about definitions and essences. In laying down the Shabbat 
laws, for instance, one rabbi asks whether transporting saliva 
in one’s mouth is considered “carrying,” in which case one 
would have to spit it out every few paces. The point of the 
question, it seems to me, is not whether a Jew should go 
around spitting all the time, but exactly how to define a 
substance: Is matter within the body a separate entity, or part 
of the body itself? This kind of speculation about substances 
and their qualities was central to classical and medieval 
thought, including Jewish thought. Because Jewish law deals 
with everyday matters, it produces a kind of everyday 
metaphysics.59 
                                                                                                     
order for the Jewish people to make proper atonement to G-d for their sins on 
this most holy day, the Talmud describes various preparations to be undertaken 
to ensure the High Priest’s presence and spiritual purity when he is needed on 
Yom Kippur. Id. Elsewhere in the Talmud, the rabbis determined that the High 
Priest must be a married man. Id. Kirsch notes that the Talmud’s tractate 
setting forth the rules for observing Yom Kippur require that “an alternate High 
Priest [be] appointed for Yom Kippur, in case the regular one was disqualified 
by ritual impurity.” Id. (discussing Yoma 13a). Rabbi Yahuda suggested, if an 
alternate High Priest was required, should not the High Priest likewise have an 
alternate wife standing by, to ensure that he satisfied the requirement that he 
be a married man? Id. The Talmud rejected this arrangement as an unnecessary 
precaution. Id.  Kirsch observes: “[T]his doesn’t stop the Gemara from picking 
up Yehuda’s suggestion and examining its legal implications. The High Priest 
doesn’t need an alternate wife, the rabbis say—but what if he did?” Id. The 
Talmud then proceeds to discuss how such a hypothetical, not-required 
precaution would be arranged. 
The Talmud itself illustrates the risk involved in dismissing seemingly absurd 
hypotheticals. In a discussion regarding the proper method for putting on tefilin 
(prayer boxes strapped to one’s head and arms), one rabbi scoffed at a question 
asking how a man with two heads should wear tefilin—in so many words telling 
the questioner to get out of here with such a stupid question. At just that 
moment, a man arrives to ask the rabbi whether he is required to make one 
donation or two for his son who was just born with two heads. See Rosenberg, In 
the Beginning, supra note 24, at 970 n.52 (discussing Menachos 37a); Menachos 
37a (discussing the obligation to make a donation of five silver shekels to 
“redeem the firstborn” from the otherwise applicable obligation of the firstborn 
to serve the Tribe of Levi). 
 59. Kirsch, What Happens When the Talmud Asks, ‘What If?’, supra note 
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Many such questions addressed by the Talmud have important 
implications to the daily lives of traditionally observant Jews. An 
observant Jew must know what he or she is permitted to carry on 
the Sabbath, while obeying the commandment to “perform no 
labor.” But the Talmud also trains the student to explore the 
essence of questions for its own intellectual exercise. 
In his attempt to introduce the Talmud to readers, like your 
humble author, who lacked a yeshiva education and years of 
Talmud learning, Adin Steinsaltz conceded that “[a]ny 
description of its subject matter or study methods must, 
inevitably be superficial because of the Talmud’s unique 
nature.”60 Steinsaltz advised that “[t]rue knowledge can only be 
attained through spiritual communion, and the student must 
participate intellectually and emotionally in the talmudic debate, 
himself becoming, to a certain degree, a creator.”61 Let us then, 
together, continue the tradition of Talmud learning, and explore 
what it has to teach us about how the American legal system 
handles the question of finality in the criminal justice system.62 
A. The Use of Talmud in American Law 
In fact, the Talmud is no stranger in this strange land. 
Justice William Douglas noted the differences between American 
constitutional law’s distinction between coerced and voluntary 
confessions and the Talmud’s exclusion from court of all 
self-incriminatory statements (whether coerced or voluntary) in 
Garrity v. New Jersey.63 In Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co.,64 
                                                                                                     
10. 
 60. STEINSALTZ, supra note 30, at 9. 
 61. Id. 
 62. For additional history and understanding of the Talmud’s place in 
Jewish law and thought, see Michael J. Broyde, The Foundations of Law: A 
Jewish Law View of World Law, 54 EMORY L.J. 79, 80 n.3 (2005) and Suzanne 
Last Stone, In Pursuit of the Counter-Text: The Turn to the Jewish Legal Model 
in Contemporary American Legal Theory, 106 HARV. L. REV. 813, 816 n.13 
(1993). 
 63. 385 U.S. 493, 497 n.5 (1967). See also Asherman v. Meachum, 957 F.2d 
978, 990 (2d Cir. 1992) (“[A]s part of the ancient Jewish law, there is found in 
the Talmud the Hebrew equivalent of the Latin maxim nemo tenetur seipsum 
prodere, ‘no one is bound to betray himself.’” (citations omitted)). 
 64. 556 U.S. 868 (2009). 
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Justice Scalia noted the Talmud’s remark, with respect to the 
Scripture—“Turn it over, and turn it over, for all is therein”—
before chiding the Supreme Court majority, saying, “Divinely 
inspired text may contain the answers to all earthly questions, 
but the Due Process Clause most assuredly does not.”65 
At times, American courts have praised as “Talmudic” 
analyses that display “breadth and thoroughness”66 or 
painstaking attempts to find “compatibility [in] seemingly 
inconsistent provisions.”67 Other American courts have dismissed 
as “Talmudic” the “dissection” of word choices that deprive court 
opinions of context,68 or the “parsing of a single sentence or two, 
as if we were occupied with a philosophical enterprise or 
linguistic analysis.”69 
 The Talmud has much to teach American lawyers, jurists, 
and scholars. One need not propose the adoption of the Talmud’s 
conclusions to questions of modern American law to appreciate its 
methodology and the pleasure of Talmudic reasoning, in the most 
positive sense of the phrase.70 
                                                                                                     
 65. Id. at 903 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 66. Faus Group, Inc. v. United States, 581 F.3d 1369, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 67. Morgan Stanley High Yield Sec., Inc. v. Seven Circle Gaming Corp., 269 
F. Supp. 2d 206, 219 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
 68. United States v. Libby, 498 F. Supp. 2d 1, 4 (D.D.C. 2007). 
 69. Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 991 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
 70. See Samuel J. Levine, Essay, Capital Punishment in Jewish Law and 
Its Application to the American Legal System: A Conceptual Overview, 29 ST. 
MARY’S L.J. 1037, 1037–38 (1998) (“In recent years, a growing body of 
scholarship has developed in the United States that applies concepts in Jewish 
law to unsettled, controversial, and challenging areas of American legal 
thought. While some scholars endorse the application of Jewish legal theory to 
American law, others are more cautious.” (footnotes omitted)); Irene Merker 
Rosenberg & Yale L. Rosenberg, Advice from Hillel and Shammai on How to 
Read Cases: Of Specificity, Retroactivity and New Rules, 42 AM. J. COMP. L. 581, 
582 (1994) (“One of the pleasures of studying Talmud . . . is encountering 
arguments between the Sages that took place 1,500–2,000 years ago concerning 
sophisticated issues that are . . . analogous to . . . American law. We are not 
surprised when the Talmud’s resolution of a problem is superior to the modern 
answers.”). 
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B. A Note on Talmud Citations 
Two versions of the Talmud exist—one compiled by the 
smaller Jewish community that remained in Jerusalem after the 
Roman exile of the Jews in 70 C.E. and one compiled by the then 
more prominent center of Jewish scholarship in Babylonia.71 
Because the Babylonian Talmud was completed at a later date, is 
more extensive in coverage, and is considered to have undergone 
more thorough editorial review, it is generally considered more 
authoritative than the Jerusalem Talmud.72 This Article uses the 
Talmud Bavli (Babylonian Talmud) as its source material. 
Working with the Talmud in translation, as I do, loses much 
of its flavor and diversity of opinion. A great deal of the Talmud’s 
value lies in the interspersed commentary on commentary, some 
of the most important being the glosses added by later scholars, 
such as Rashi, added to the margins of the original material. 
Published translations lose much of this material. For my 
lay-scholar purposes, I have worked with the ArtScroll Series 
Schottenstein Travel Edition of the Talmud Bavli.73 Though I am 
citing to an English language translation, I will adhere to 
traditional Talmud citation forms and reference quoted passages 
by tractate and folio (folios being further divided into two parts—
a and b—representing the Hebrew letters aleph and bet).74 Thus, 
I will cite the key passage discussed below as “Sanhedrin 43a” 
and will not refer to the page number of my particular volume in 
translation. In fact, the Schottenstein Edition, following 
tradition, contains no page numbers for its translation.75 Some 
folios are given additional superscript notations, e.g., “Sanhedrin 
34a1.” I will cite references to the modern footnoted explanations 
                                                                                                     
 71. See Pritikin, supra note 33, at 353–54 (providing more detail on the 
origins of both versions of the Talmud). 
 72. See id. (explaining differences between the two versions of the Talmud). 
73.  Schottenstein Travel Edition of the Talmud Bavli (Rabbi Tisroel Simcha 
Schorr & Rabbi Chaim Malinowitz eds., 2009) [hereinafter the Schottenstein 
Edition]. 
 74. See Rosenberg, In the Beginning, supra note 24, at 969 n.49 (explaining 
naming conventions of the Talmud). 
 75. See id. (“Although modern editions include page numbers in Arabic 
numerals, it is considered a sign of ignorance and bad form to use them in 
Talmudic discourse.”). 
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added by the editors of my edition, for example, as “Sanhedrin 
43a Schottenstein Edition n.24.”  
III. Comparing Criminal Justice Under American and Jewish 
Law  
This Part will summarize and compare the basic substantive 
and procedural facets of the American and Talmudic criminal 
justice systems, with particular attention to the procedural 
requirements for appellate review of guilty verdicts. This Article 
will not engage in a thorough analysis of the substantive hurdles 
claimants must overcome. This Article will present procedural 
limitations and substantive standards in summary fashion 
merely to give readers an idea of how the respective criminal 
justice systems function and compare. For example, while the 
Talmud permits a convicted defendant to present any new 
argument so long as there is “substance” to it,76 American law 
restricts petitioners attempting to raise new claims they failed to 
raise in previous rounds of review to claims that could not have 
been discovered previously or which have only become available 
through a recent change in applicable law.77 What sorts of 
arguments will satisfy the Talmud’s or AEDPA’s requirements 
can be addressed in greater detail elsewhere. It is my intention 
here merely to demonstrate that the American legal system 
imposes greater limitations on the number and kinds of new 
arguments a condemned prisoner may raise to reargue the 
question of his guilt than the Talmud’s legal system does. Once 
we have confronted the difference in how the American legal 
system and Talmudic legal system treat the interest in finality, 
we can then explore the implications of this difference as brought 
out in the debates among the Talmud’s rabbis and American 
jurists when a difficult case strains the court’s willingness to 
accept a final decision. 
                                                                                                     
 76. See Sanhedrin 42b–43a (laying out the Talmud conditions for a 
convicted person to bring up a new argument on appeal). 
 77. See infra Parts II–III (discussing the United States’ conception of a fair 
trial and appeal).  
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A. American Law’s Limitations on Post-Conviction Review 
Anyone who tells you that some large number of judges has 
reviewed a criminal conviction and assured themselves that the 
convicted defendant was guilty is someone who does not 
understand how the American criminal justice system works.  
1. A Fair Trial 
Accused defendants are entitled to a familiar panoply of 
constitutional safeguards to ensure that their trials are fair—the 
right to counsel, the right to confront and cross-examine 
witnesses, the introduction of only evidence that was collected 
according to constitutional requirements, the prosecution’s 
burden to prove the accused’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, et 
cetera.78 But after such a trial is held, the defendant’s guilt is 
something that the jury decides, not the judge (unless the 
defendant has waived that right and consented to a bench trial).79 
Even the trial judge, in the first instance, can only throw out the 
jury’s verdict and enter a judgment of acquittal if she determines 
that “a reasonable jury could not [have found] guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt.”80 It is not within the trial judge’s prerogative 
to simply “reweigh the evidence or second-guess the jury’s 
credibility determinations.”81 Short of ruling that no reasonable 
jury could have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the best 
the trial judge can do is order a new trial “if [she] believes that 
there is a serious danger that a miscarriage of justice has 
occurred—that is, that an innocent person has been convicted.”82 
As the phrase suggests, when a defendant successfully moves for 
a new trial order based on such a ruling, he still faces possible 
conviction at the conclusion of that new trial.83 
                                                                                                     
 78. U.S. CONST. amends. IV, V, and VI. 
 79. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.  
 80. United States v. Jones, 713 F.3d 336, 339 (7th Cir. 2013).  
 81. See United States v. Gonzalez, 737 F.3d 1163, 1168 (7th Cir. 2013) 
(noting that the decision a jury gives should be given great deference by the 
judge). 
 82. United States v. Silveus, 542 F.3d 993, 1004–05 (3d Cir. 2008). 
 83. See United States v. Alvarez-Moreno, 657 F.3d 896, 901 (9th Cir. 2011) 
(detailing when a motion for a new trial can be made). 
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2. A Direct Appeal 
A convicted defendant may file a direct appeal challenging 
the legal sufficiency of the evidence against him to support the 
verdict (reviewed de novo by the appellate court, albeit with all 
inferences arising from the evidence made in the light most 
supportive of the guilty verdict).84 “A jury’s verdict cannot be 
overturned if any reasonable construction of the evidence would 
have allowed the jury to find the defendant guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt.”85 Jurors, after all, had the opportunity to hear 
the evidence first-hand and look the witnesses in the eye when 
weighing their credibility, while all appellate courts have to go on 
are the cold transcripts of the trial proceedings.86 
A convicted defendant may also seek a new trial on the basis 
of any evidentiary87 or procedural errors88 he asserts the trial 
judge may have made (reviewed only for an abuse of the trial 
judge’s discretion over such matters). The appellate court reviews 
the trial court’s findings of fact for clear error and reviews legal 
errors (such as misapplication of the law or infringement of 
constitutional rights) de novo.89 That is, while an appellate court 
is free to decide for itself whether the trial court properly 
interpreted and applied the law,90 an appellate court reviews the 
                                                                                                     
 84. United States v. Friske, 640 F.3d 1288, 1290–91 (11th Cir. 2011). 
 85. Id. (citation omitted). 
 86. See, e.g., United States v. Curry, 79 F.3d 1489, 1497 (7th Cir. 1996) (“As 
an appellate court, we will not second-guess the jury on [the credibility 
determination], which was best resolved through giving the . . . jury the 
opportunity to observe the verbal and non-verbal behavior of the 
witnesses . . . rather than looking at the cold pages [of a transcript].” (quoting 
United States v. Lakich, 23 F.3d 1203, 1210–11 (7th Cir. 1994))). 
 87. See United States v. Hale, 685 F.3d 522, 538 (5th Cir. 2012) (examining 
what sort of evidentiary errors would lead to abuse of discretion). 
 88. See United States v. Jirak, 728 F.3d 806, 815 (8th Cir. 2013) (“We 
review a district court’s denial of a request for continuance for an abuse of 
discretion and will only reverse if the moving party was prejudiced by the 
denial.”). 
 89. See United States v. Howard, 621 F.3d 433, 450 (6th Cir. 2010) 
(explaining the applicable standards of review); United States v. Lazarenko, 564 
F.3d 1026, 1043 (9th Cir. 2009) (same). 
 90. See United States v. Williams, 340 F.3d 1231, 1237 (11th Cir. 2003) 
(“[D]e novo review requires us to look at a question as if we are the first court to 
consider it. Put simply, it is definitionally impossible to give deference of any 
sort to a decision being reviewed de novo.”). 
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trial court’s factual findings with greater deference and will only 
reverse the trial court’s decision if, after reviewing all of the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the decision, it is left with 
“a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.”91 
An appellate court reviews a defendant’s sentence for both 
procedural error and substantive reasonableness under a 
deferential abuse of discretion standard.92 
Still, a criminal defendant is entitled only to a “fair trial,” not 
a perfect one, “for there are no perfect trials.”93 Under the 
Harmless Error doctrine, “[a]ny error, defect, irregularity, or 
variance that does not affect [a defendant’s] substantial rights 
must be disregarded.”94 The requirement that an error affect a 
defendant’s substantial rights in order to be considered reversible 
error essentially means that it “must have affected the outcome” 
of the trial.95 The Harmless Error doctrine—requiring the 
prosecution to establish that a challenged error did not affect the 
outcome of the trial in order to preserve the judgment—applies 
only to claims of error that the defendant preserved at trial by 
raising a contemporaneous objection to the challenged conduct.96 
If the defendant failed to raise a contemporaneous objection at 
trial, the burden switches to him and he would be required to 
establish on appeal that any claimed error constituted “plain 
error”—i.e., error that was plainly established by the time of the 
appeal, affected the outcome of the trial, and seriously affected 
the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial 
proceedings.97 Only certain structural errors—such as the total 
                                                                                                     
 91. United States v. Camacho, 661 F.3d 718, 728 n.3 (1st Cir. 2011). 
 92. See United States v. Gibson, 708 F.3d 1256, 1275 (11th Cir. 2013) 
(citations omitted) (describing the different levels of analysis used under an 
abuse of discretion standard). 
 93. Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223, 231–32 (1973). 
 94. FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(a). 
 95. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734 (1993). 
 96. See United States v. Barone, 114 F.3d 1284, 1293 (1st Cir. 1997) 
(“[A]bsent a timely objection at trial, our review is solely for plain error under 
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b).” (quoting United States v. Reed, 977 
F.2d 14, 17 (1st Cir. 1992))). 
 97. See Olano, 507 U.S. at 732, 734–35 (“It is the defendant rather than the 
Government who bears the burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice. In 
most cases, a court of appeals cannot correct the forfeited error unless the 
defendant shows that the error was prejudicial.”). 
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deprivation of the right to counsel or the right to an impartial 
judge—are said to so fundamentally “affect[] the framework 
within which the trial proceeds” that they are exempt from 
harmless or plain error analysis and trigger an automatic 
reversal of a judgment and the defendant’s right to a new trial.98 
Such structural defects so pervasively affect the proceedings that 
the “trial cannot reliably serve its function as a vehicle for 
determination of guilt or innocence.”99 The process the defendant 
received in such cases cannot properly be called a “trial” at all. 
Absent such a structural error, however, the defendant’s appeal 
depends on establishing that any errors committed at his trial 
sufficiently affected the outcome to be considered reversible 
errors. 
For a defendant tried in federal court, his direct appeal is to 
the United States Court of Appeals, and if the appellate court 
rules against him, he may seek review by the United States 
Supreme Court.100 In the case of a defendant tried and convicted 
in state court, he may seek Supreme Court review from the final 
decision of whichever state appellate court constituted the court 
of last resort in his circumstances.101 In either case, the United 
States Supreme Court has discretion whether to accept review of 
the lower court’s ruling, and typically accepts review of a very 
small percentage of the cases seeking its attention.102 In an 
average year, the Supreme Court receives approximately 7,000–
8,000 petitions to review lower court decisions and hears 
argument in only about eighty cases.103 In its 2012–2013 term, 
                                                                                                     
 98. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 309–10 (1991). 
 99. Id.  
 100. See 28 U.S.C. § 1254 (2012) (describing methods of Supreme Court 
review of circuit court decisions). 
 101. The United States Supreme Court has discretionary authority to review 
“judgments of a ‘state court of last resort’ or of a lower state court if the ‘state 
court of last resort’ has denied discretionary review.” Gonzalez v. Thaler, 132 S. 
Ct. 641, 656 (2012) (quoting SUP. CT. R. 13.1). See also 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (2012) 
(granting the Supreme Court certiorari jurisdiction to review “[f]inal judgments 
or decrees rendered by the highest court of a State in which a decision could be 
had”). 
 102. See SUP. CT. R. 10 (“Review on a writ of certiorari is not a matter of 
right, but of judicial discretion. A petition for writ of certiorari will be granted 
only for compelling reasons.”). 
 103. Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ), SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED 
STATES, http://www.supremecourt.gov/faq.aspx (last visited Sept. 21, 2016) (on 
THE SUPREME COURT’S TALMUDIC DEBATE 1265 
only twenty-one out of seventy-eight cases decided on the merits 
were criminal matters.104 In the unlikely event that the Supreme 
Court hears the case, it will review whether the lower courts 
applied the correct legal standards, not the substantive merits of 
the jury’s verdict.105  
That is the defendant’s one direct appeal. After the court of 
last resort, whether it is the state or federal intermediate 
appellate court or the Supreme Court, has denied the defendant 
relief from his conviction or sentence, the judgment is considered 
final.106 
There are various reasons for the procedural and substantive 
limitations on direct appeals and deferential review afforded trial 
court decisions, but the point is that the appellate system is 
designed to ensure that a defendant receives a fair trial because a 
trial is where the question of a defendant’s guilt is determined. 
The appellate system is not intended to answer that question, but 
to make sure that that question is answered in a trustworthy 
manner. If we satisfy ourselves that the inputs used to decide the 
question of the defendant’s guilt merited our trust, then we can 
accept the verdict produced by the trial. 
3. Collateral Review 
To help safeguard the output produced by the trial and direct 
appeal processes, additional but circumscribed opportunities to 
                                                                                                     
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 104. Kedar S. Bhatia, Final October Term 2012 Stat Pack, SCOTUSBLOG at 
6 (June 27, 2013), http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/06/final-october-term-2012-
stat-pack/ (last visited Sept. 21, 2016) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 105. See Christopher R. Drahozal, Error Correction and the Supreme Court’s 
Arbitration Docket, 29 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 1, 6 (2014) (“[T]he Court is 
not in the business of error correction. Rather, the Court seeks to decide legal 
issues of broad public importance.” (footnote omitted)); SUP. CT. R. 10 (“A 
petition for a writ of certiorari is rarely granted when the asserted error consists 
of erroneous factual findings or the misapplication of a properly stated rule of 
law.”). 
 106. See Clay v. United States, 537 U.S. 522, 527 (2003) (“Finality attaches 
when [the Supreme] Court affirms a conviction on the merits on direct review or 
denies a petition for a writ of certiorari, or when the time for filing a certiorari 
petition expires.”). 
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correct errors exist through the collateral review process. This 
process, long-maligned as a series of endless appeals, has been 
curtailed in recent decades as American law sought to 
re-emphasize the finality of criminal judgments.107  
As the defendant—now serving his sentence and thereafter 
generally referred to as the “prisoner” (or “petitioner” or 
“movant,” depending the procedural context)—seeks another 
journey up the ladder of review, each additional step constricts 
the extent to which the substance of his arguments are at issue. 
The question of his guilt becomes more and more subordinate to 
questions regarding his compliance with various procedural 
hurdles and deadlines and with issues regarding the extent to 
which his arguments are cognizable at all. Each successive court 
starts with the prisoner’s guilt as an established proposition and 
has to be convinced that it is even its business to re-examine the 
process that made that determination. 
A prisoner convicted in federal court can ask the federal trial 
court to vacate his conviction and sentence, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2255, on the grounds that the judgment was imposed “in 
violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States.”108 A 
prisoner convicted in state court can bring a similar action in 
federal court, after first exhausting his available 
post-direct-appeal review remedies in state court.109 These 
proceedings—collateral to the prisoner’s original trial and 
appeal—though generally defined by statute in modern practice, 
arose out of the Common Law writ of habeas corpus and still can 
be referred to as habeas petitions.110 
                                                                                                     
 107. See generally Scott R. Grubman, What a Relief? The Availability of 
Habeas Relief Under the Savings Clause of Section 2255 of the AEDPA, 64 S.C. 
L. REV. 369 (2012) (providing additional history and background on the common 
law writ of habeas corpus and AEDPA’s modern adaptation of its substantive 
and procedural application); Randal S. Jeffrey, Successive Habeas Corpus 
Petitions and Section 2255 Motions After the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 
Penalty Act of 1996: Emerging Procedural and Substantive Issues, 84 MARQ. L. 
REV. 43 (2000) (same). 
 108. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012). See also United States v. Berry, 624 F.3d 1031, 
1038 (9th Cir. 2010) (explaining the purpose and function of 28 U.S.C. § 2255). 
 109. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (2012) (addressing federal collateral review 
remedies for State prisoners). 
 110. The Talmudic conundrum regarding the extent to which a § 2255 
proceeding is “not a habeas corpus proceeding,” while providing a remedy 
“exactly commensurate with that which had previously been available by habeas 
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Such a petition “may not be used as a chance at a second 
appeal.”111 “Because collateral review is not a substitute for a 
direct appeal . . . a defendant must assert all available claims on 
direct appeal,” and “relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is reserved for 
transgressions of constitutional rights and for that narrow 
compass of other injury that could not have been raised in direct 
appeal and would, if condoned, result in a complete miscarriage of 
justice.”112  
A state113 and a federal prisoner114 each face a one-year 
period of limitation in which to bring his habeas claim in federal 
court, running from the latest of: the date his judgment becomes 
final on direct appeal; the date on which any impediment to his 
filing his claims created by government action “in violation of the 
Constitution or laws of the United States is removed”;115 “the 
date on which the [constitutional] right asserted was initially 
recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly 
recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively 
applicable to cases on collateral review”;116 or “the date on which 
the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have 
been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.”117  
A federal habeas court will not grant relief to prisoners 
convicted in state court for “any claim that was adjudicated on 
the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of 
the claim”: 
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, 
as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or  
                                                                                                     
corpus in the court of the district where the prisoner was confined,” is beyond 
the scope of this Article. Brown v. United States, 748 F.3d 1045, 1059–60 (11th 
Cir. 2014) (quoting United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 220 (1952), and Hill 
v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 427 (1962)). 
 111. Berry, 624 F.3d at 1038 (citation omitted). 
 112. Lynn v. United States, 365 F.3d 1225, 1232 (11th Cir. 2004) (citations 
omitted). 
 113. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) (2012). 
 114. Id. § 2255(f) (2012). 
 115. Id. § 2244(d)(1)(B); id. § 2255(f)(2).  
 116. Id. § 2244(d)(1)(C); id. § 2255(f)(3). 
 117. Id. § 2244(d)(1)(D) (2012); id. § 2255(f)(4). 
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(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable 
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in 
the State court proceeding.118 
This additional layer of review in federal court, thus, does not 
grant a federal judge discretion to decide for himself whether he 
thinks the prisoner’s previously-raised claims are meritorious. If 
anything, a federal court owes additional deference to the state 
courts’ handling of the convicted defendant’s claims. “[O]n habeas 
review, ‘a federal court may not overturn a state court decision 
rejecting a sufficiency of the evidence challenge simply because 
the federal court disagrees with the state court. The federal court 
instead may do so only if the state court decision was objectively 
unreasonable.’”119 Factual determinations made by the state 
court while considering the prisoner’s state collateral review 
petition are presumed by the federal court to be correct and the 
prisoner has “the burden of rebutting the presumption of 
correctness by clear and convincing evidence.”120 
Federal courts are not only limited in their ability to 
reconsider claims state prisoners already presented to the state 
courts; they are also limited in their ability to consider claims 
state prisoners are trying to raise for the first time in federal 
court. If a state prisoner “failed to develop the factual basis of a 
claim in state court proceedings,” the federal habeas court will 
only hold an evidentiary hearing on the claim under certain 
circumstances. First, the claim must rely on a “new rule of 
constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review 
by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable,” or on “a 
factual predicate that could not have been previously discovered 
through the exercise of due diligence,” and, second, “the facts 
underlying the claim would be sufficient to establish by clear and 
convincing evidence that but for constitutional error, no 
                                                                                                     
 118. Id. § 2254(d). 
 119. Coleman v. Johnson, 132 S. Ct. 2060, 2062 (2012) (citation omitted). See 
also Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 141 (2005) (“A state-court decision is 
contrary to this Court’s clearly established precedents if it applies a rule that 
contradicts the governing law set forth in our cases, or if it confronts a set of 
facts that is materially indistinguishable from a decision of this Court but 
reaches a different result.”). 
 120. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) (2012). 
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reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of the 
underlying offense.”121 
If a prisoner wants to file a second or successive habeas 
petition, our system avoids re-examining old decisions once made 
and even resists considering newly-thought-of arguments that 
could have been raised earlier. A state122 or federal123 prisoner 
cannot reargue any issues he raised unsuccessfully in an earlier 
petition. Nor can he raise any new issue he failed to raise earlier 
unless he can show that: 
(A) the claim relies on a new rule of constitutional law, made 
retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, 
that was previously unavailable; or  
(B)(i) the factual predicate for the claim could not have been 
discovered previously through the exercise of due diligence; 
and  
(ii) the facts underlying the claim, if proven and viewed in 
light of the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to 
establish by clear and convincing evidence that, but for 
constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have 
found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense.124 
In order even to file such a new claim in federal court, the 
petitioner must first “move in the appropriate court of appeals for 
an order authorizing the district court to consider the 
application.”125 If the appellate court refuses to authorize the 
filing of a second or successive petition, that order “shall not be 
appealable and shall not be the subject of a petition for rehearing 
or for a writ of certiorari.”126  
If a prisoner does manage to get his habeas claims heard by 
the federal trial court, and that court denies his petition, he can 
                                                                                                     
 121. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) (2012). 
 122. See id. § 2244(b)(1) (“A claim presented in a second or successive 
habeas corpus application under section 2254 that was presented in a prior 
application shall be dismissed.”). 
 123. See id. § 2255(h) (requiring a second or successive motion by a federal 
prisoner to vacate, set aside, or correct a sentence to be certified by a panel to 
contain new evidence or a new rule of constitutional law not previously 
available); id. § 2244(a) (cross-referencing § 2255). 
 124. Id. § 2244(b)(2). 
 125. Id. § 2244(b)(3)(A). 
 126. Id. § 2244(b)(3)(E). 
1270 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1243 (2016) 
only obtain review by the federal appellate court if either the trial 
judge or the appellate court grants him a certificate of 
appealability.127 Such a certificate is only warranted if the 
petitioner “has made a substantial showing of the denial of a 
constitutional right.”128 
A prisoner asserting his innocence will find that each step up 
the ladder of review, or return trip up the ladder, comes with 
additional reliance on the results of decisions made previously. In 
holding that a prisoner, generally, has no right to appointed 
counsel to help him navigate the collateral review process, the 
Supreme Court “contrasted the trial stage of a criminal 
proceeding, where the State by presenting witnesses and arguing 
to a jury attempts to strip from the defendant the presumption of 
innocence,” from later proceedings “where the defendant needs an 
attorney not as a shield to protect him against being ‘haled into 
court’ by the State and stripped of his presumption of innocence, 
but rather as a sword to upset the prior determination of guilt.”129 
The Supreme Court explained that “[p]ostconviction relief is even 
further removed from the criminal trial than is discretionary 
direct review” and “serve[s] a different and more limited purpose 
than either the trial or appeal.”130 
AEDPA added weight to finality in the courts’ balancing act 
with accuracy. A prisoner seeking a return trip to the courthouse 
to have his actual guilt or innocence re-examined has a difficult 
road to travel.131 
                                                                                                     
 127. Id. § 2253(c). 
 128. Id. § 2253(c)(2). 
 129. Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 7 (1989) (quotations omitted). Of 
course, as with many collateral review issues, the right to an appointed attorney 
within this process is somewhat complicated. See Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 
1309, 1320 (2012) (holding that “a procedural default will not bar a federal 
habeas court from hearing a substantial claim of ineffective assistance at trial if, 
in the initial-review collateral proceeding, there was no counsel or counsel in 
that proceeding was ineffective”); see also Trevino v. Thaler, 133 S. Ct. 1911, 
1921 (2013) (extending Martinez’s holding to cases “where . . . [a] state 
procedural framework, by reason of its design and operation, makes it highly 
unlikely in a typical case that a defendant will have a meaningful opportunity to 
raise a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel on direct appeal”). 
 130. Giarratano, 492 U.S. at 8, 10 (citation omitted). 
 131. See Grubman, supra note 107, at 378–81 (discussing “AEDPA’s 
Restrictions on Second or Successive Motions for Post-Conviction Relief”). See 
generally, Jeffrey, supra note 107 (discussing AEDPA’s “dramatic[] change[s]” to 
THE SUPREME COURT’S TALMUDIC DEBATE 1271 
B. The Talmud’s Open-Ended Post-Conviction Review Process 
Like America’s criminal justice system, the Talmud requires 
various procedural safeguards to protect the rights of the 
accused. Though the Talmud imposes a death penalty for a 
variety of offenses, “[t]he rabbinic legal system is. . . so extreme in 
protecting both the innocent and the guilty” that the “barriers to 
imposition of the death penalty by the rabbinic courts amount to 
a supercharged Bill of Rights.”132 A common retort to the 
Talmud’s repeated endorsement of the death penalty and 
exhaustive discussion of the proper (and to the modern mind, 
horrific) means of carrying it out is the expression that any court 
that managed to overcome the numerous hurdles to actually 
imposing a death sentence even once in seven years “was known 
as ‘the killing court.’”133 
                                                                                                     
“both the procedural and substantive law governing second and successive 
applications” for collateral relief).  As Jeffrey recognizes, “[o]ne focus of the 
AEDPA was to restrict habeas corpus relief available in the federal courts.” Id. 
at 44. 
 132. See Rosenberg, Of God’s Mercy, supra note 31, at 1177, 1191–92 
(discussing the Talmud’s barriers to carrying out the death penalty and the four 
methods of execution utilized on those occasions when it is carried out). 
 133. STEINSALTZ, supra note 30, at 206. The Talmud itself describes such a 
court as a “destroyer.” Makkot 7a. Preeminent rabbis Tarfon and Akiva went so 
far as to assert that “[h]ad we been on a sanhedrin [at the time when they still 
convened and imposed death sentences,] no person would ever have been 
executed.” Makkot 7a. Lest the reader think the rabbis were in agreement on 
the criminal justice implications of a system of harsh capital punishments with 
lax practical enforcement, Rabban Simeon ben Gamaliel replied to Tarfon and 
Akiva that their policy “would thus increase shedders of blood in Israel.” THE 
BOOK OF LEGENDS (SEFER HA-AGGADAH): LEGENDS FROM THE TALMUD AND 
MIDRASH 744 (Hayim Nahman Bialik & Yehoshua Hana Ravnitzky eds., 
William G. Raude trans., Schoken Books 1992). Some resolve this dilemma by 
deeming the entire capital criminal procedure set forth in the Talmud to be 
“merely idealistic and pedagogical, . . . never actually implemented or intended 
to be implemented.” Rosenberg, Of God’s Mercy, supra note 31, at 1175. For 
additional discussion about the debate between Rabbis Akiva and Tarfon and 
Rabban Simeon ben Gamaliel, see Levine, supra note 70, at 1046–48. 
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1. Trial Protections in the Talmud 
A special court of twenty-three judges, referred to as the 
Sanhedrei Katana, tried capital offenses.134 A guilty verdict 
required a majority vote by at least a three-judge margin (i.e., at 
least thirteen to ten), and while “[a] judge who expressed an 
opinion in favor of the defendant was forbidden to change his 
views,” a change of mind in favor of the defendant was 
permitted.135 
Guilty verdicts required testimony from at least two adult 
eye-witnesses to the offense, who themselves had never been 
accused of a criminal offense of any kind and who were not 
related to the parties, judges, or each other.136 Not only could a 
defendant not be required to incriminate himself, he was not 
permitted to do so, and any such evidence was inadmissible.137 
Witnesses could only testify to what they personally observed—
hearsay evidence was not permitted.138 “Such eyewitness 
testimony [was] the only valid method of proof”—no 
circumstantial evidence was permitted—and any discrepancies in 
the witnesses’ testimony, “even as to relatively minor matters,” 
would cause the court to exclude their testimony.139 In order for 
an accused defendant to be condemned to death, the evidence 
must show that he acted with specific intent to commit a capital 
                                                                                                     
 134. See STEINSALTZ, supra note 30, at 203 (explaining that the twenty-three 
judge court was known as the “Small Sanhedrin,” in contrast to the “Great 
Sanhedrin” (Sanhedrei Gadol), a seventy-one judge body authorized to try cases 
involving false prophets, sages who instructed people to act in violation of the 
law, and other grave offenses). 
 135. Id. at 206. But see Sanhedrin 34a1 (describing a rabbinic debate over 
whether the rule prohibiting a judge from changing his mind in favor of 
conviction applies only during initial deliberations during which judges are 
encouraged to maintain their arguments, but would allow him to change his 
mind at the vote on the verdict). Additional commentary on this debate can be 
found in Sanhedrin 34a1 Schottenstein Edition nn.5–7. 
 136. STEINSALTZ, supra note 30, at 204; see also Rosenberg, Of God’s Mercy, 
supra note 31, at 1179 (characterizing the evidentiary and procedural 
safeguards, including the two-witness rule, as “breathtaking”). 
 137. STEINSALTZ, supra note 30, at 205. 
 138. Id. at 206. 
 139. See Rosenberg, Of God’s Mercy, supra note 31, at 1179 (explaining how 
the judges would interrogate witnesses on tangential matters, like the thickness 
of a fig tree’s branches at the site of a crime). 
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offense.140 Such proof required testimony that he was specifically 
warned immediately before committing the act that it was 
forbidden by law and punishable by death and that he 
acknowledged those facts and carried out the action anyway.141  
2. Appellate Review in the Talmud 
Talmudic courts were not hierarchically-structured, and thus 
challenges seeking review of a verdict were raised before the 
same court and judges that issued the original decision.142 Like 
the American system,143 the Talmud provided that capital cases 
“may be reversed in favor of acquittal . . . but they are not 
reversed in favor of conviction.”144 Interestingly, though it 
presents the matter as at least open to question, the Talmud 
seems to permit reversals of judgments of acquittal in at least 
certain non-capital cases.145 
Executions were to take place immediately after a verdict 
was reached, but the Mishnah states: 
                                                                                                     
 140. STEINSALTZ, supra note 30, at 206.  
 141. Id.; see also Rosenberg, Of God’s Mercy, supra note 31, at 1179 (noting 
that two competent witnesses testifying that, in their view, the accused 
proceeded to commit the capital offense after he was warned of the consequences 
“is the only valid method of proof”). 
 142. STEINSALTZ, supra note 30, at 202.  
 143. Under American law, the prosecution may appeal from a trial judge’s 
post-verdict judgment of acquittal setting aside a jury’s guilty verdict, but it 
may not seek to overturn a jury’s verdict in favor of acquittal without running 
afoul of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment. See U.S. CONST. 
amend. V (providing that no person shall be “twice put in jeopardy”); United 
States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 568–76 (1977) (concluding that 
double jeopardy bars prosecutorial appeals from Rule 29(c) judgments of 
acquittal); United States v. Ogles, 440 F.3d 1095, 1099–1101 (9th Cir. 2006) 
(applying the double jeopardy rule to a court-directed acquittal upon the close of 
the prosecution’s case); United States v. Moran, 312 F.3d 480, 487 n.7 (1st Cir. 
2002) (finding that the double jeopardy clause did not bar appeal because the 
judgment of acquittal came after a guilty verdict by the jury). 
 144. Sanhedrin 33b1. 
 145. See Sanhedrin 33b2–33b3 (relating the debates regarding whether death 
penalty acquittals may be reconsidered in cases where lesser punishments 
might still be imposed or whether the general rule even applies in all capital 
cases). 
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While the condemned is being escorted to the execution 
grounds, one man stands at the courthouse door with flags in 
his hand, and another sits astride a horse at a distance from 
him, but still within sight. If someone says: I have grounds to 
argue for his acquittal, [the flagman] waves the flags as a 
signal, and the horse with its rider races to the execution party 
and halts them. And even if [the condemned] himself says, “I 
have grounds to argue for my own acquittal,” they return him 
to the courthouse to consider his arguments.146 
Thus, even the condemned is entitled to seek re-argument of his 
case “again and again,” as many times as he requests, so long as 
there is “substance” in his argument.147 Though the Mishnah 
states that the condemned is returned to the courthouse “even 
four or five times,” this phrase is understood to be used 
figuratively and “there is actually no limit to the number of times 
he may be brought back for reconsideration of his case,” as long 
as he satisfies the “substance” requirement.148 
A member of the court could always call for the condemned to 
be returned for further consideration of his case.149 When capital 
cases were tried, rabbinic disciples would observe the 
proceedings, “and if one of them wished to advance an argument 
in favor of acquittal,” he could do so, and “[i]f his words were 
found to be of substance, he was elevated to the position of one of 
the judges, and was given full voting rights.”150  
The requirement that the condemned raise an argument with 
meaningful substance to it only applied to his third, fourth, or 
subsequent challenges. Thus, beginning on the third time the 
condemned leaves the courthouse on his way to his execution, “a 
                                                                                                     
 146. Sanhedrin 42b. 
 147. Sanhedrin 42b–43a (discussing the Mishnah’s statement that the 
accused “is returned again and again . . . as long as there is substance to his 
words”); Sanhedrin 42b Schottenstein Edition n.9 (noting Rashi’s holding that 
“[i]f he presents an argument that seems to have some validity, he is returned to 
the court for the consideration of his argument”). 
 148. Sanhedrin 42b Schottenstein Edition n.8.  
 149. See Rosenberg, Of God’s Mercy, supra note 31, at 1186–87 (explaining 
further that “the law requires that there be a sufficient distance for the 
defendant to travel while court officials ride with him, shouting out his name, 
his crime, and the names of the prosecuting witnesses, and asking anyone who 
has exculpatory information to come forward”). 
 150. Sanhedrin 43a Schottenstein Edition n.22. 
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pair of Torah scholars . . . accompany him,” to determine whether 
there is substance to his challenge or not.151  
The first two times he is returned even if his argument 
appears baseless, for it is possible that he indeed has a valid 
argument but is unable to properly express it due to his fright. 
When he returns to the courthouse, his mind will become more 
settled and he will be able to present his case more 
coherently.152 
Unlike the American legal system, a condemned prisoner’s 
ability to return for further review of his case does not diminish 
with every step he takes away from the courtroom. Under the 
Talmud’s criminal justice system, there is no deference paid to 
the tribunal’s earlier rulings in favor of the condemned’s guilt, 
there is no penalty for failing to raise a claim at a previous 
opportunity, and there are no procedural hurdles to overcome 
before a claim can be heard on its merits. “Jewish law encourages 
the reopening of cases to assure consideration of all nonfrivolous 
arguments.”153 A case only becomes “final” when the death 
sentence is carried out. 
C. American Law’s Partial Gateway Back to the Courthouse 
While the American legal system may impose significant 
procedural and substantive barriers to returning to the 
courthouse, as it were, it at least recognizes the conundrum posed 
by a claim of actual innocence by a condemned prisoner. This 
scenario cannot be taken lightly, as the many condemned 
prisoners released from death row demonstrate.154 Yet, under the 
                                                                                                     
 151. Sanhedrin 43a. 
 152. Sanhedrin 43a Schottenstein Edition n.32. 
 153. Rosenberg, Of God’s Mercy, supra note 31, at 1190–91. 
 154. See Douglas A. Blackmon, DNA Evidence Exonerates Louisiana Death-
row Inmate, WASH. POST, Sept. 29, 2012, at A03 (“With Thibodeaux’s release 
Friday, he became the 300th wrongly convicted person and 18th death-row 
inmate exonerated in the United States substantially on the basis of DNA 
evidence, according to the New York-based Innocence Project, which provides 
legal counsel to prisoners it believes can be exonerated through DNA testing.”); 
Adam Liptak, Study of Wrongful Convictions Raises Questions Beyond DNA, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2007, at A1 (reporting on the case of Jerry Miller, who 
became the 200th American prisoner released by DNA evidence under the 
Innocence Project, and the fourteenth on death row). 
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American legal system, even having the opportunity to try to 
establish one’s innocence in court, after one has been found guilty 
and has exhausted all of the available avenues of direct and 
collateral review, is not a road much traveled. 
In a pre-AEDPA case, Leonel Torres Herrera was convicted 
in Texas state court of capital murder and sentenced to death.155 
He then unsuccessfully challenged his conviction in both direct 
appellate proceedings and state and federal collateral review 
proceedings.156 Ten years after his conviction, he filed a second 
federal habeas petition, arguing that he was “actually innocent” 
of the murder and that the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on 
“cruel and unusual punishment[]”157 and the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s guarantee of “due process of law”158 therefore 
precluded his execution.159 Herrera proffered new evidence that 
someone else had committed the crime.160 After the federal trial 
court considering his new habeas petition dismissed an additional 
claim alleging a constitutional violation during Herrera’s 
prosecution, it stayed his execution to consider his new 
evidence.161 The federal appellate court vacated the stay, citing 
then-existing precedent “that claims of newly discovered 
evidence, casting doubt on the petitioner’s guilt, are not 
cognizable in federal habeas corpus.”162 Only new evidence that 
“bear[s] upon the constitutionality of the applicant’s detention,” 
such as a constitutional violation in his original trial, could 
justify federal habeas relief; a federal court could not consider 
                                                                                                     
 155. See Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 393 (1993) (recounting the trial 
and conviction of Herrera for the murder of a police officer in January 1982, 
after which Herrera also pled guilty in July 1982 to the murder of a public 
safety officer). 
 156. Id. 
 157. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
 158. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
 159. See Herrera, 506 U.S. at 393 (summarizing petitioner’s claims). 
 160. See id. at 393, 396–97 (offering multiple affidavits that Herrera’s 
brother, who died in 1984, committed the crimes). 
 161. See id. at 397 (noting the previous rejection of Herrera’s separate 
Constitutional claims for lack of evidentiary basis). 
 162. Herrera v. Collins, 954 F.2d 1029, 1033 (5th Cir. 1992) (citing 
Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 317 (1963)). 
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evidence that was “merely . . . relevant to the guilt of a state 
prisoner.”163  
Reviewing the federal appellate court’s ruling, the United 
States Supreme Court reaffirmed “that federal habeas courts sit 
to ensure that individuals are not imprisoned in violation of the 
Constitution—not to correct errors of fact.”164 The Supreme Court 
noted that a person charged with a crime “is entitled to a 
presumption of innocence,” but Herrera was not.165 “[I]n the eyes 
of the law, petitioner does not come before the Court as one who 
is ‘innocent,’ but, on the contrary, as one who has been convicted 
by due process of law of two brutal murders.”166 Chief Justice 
Rehnquist noted the various constitutional safeguards “ensuring 
against the risk of convicting an innocent person,” but, echoing 
Chief Justice Burger’s acknowledgement that a defendant is 
entitled to a fair trial but not a perfect one, he reiterated that 
“due process does not require that every conceivable step be 
taken, at whatever cost, to eliminate the possibility of convicting 
an innocent person.”167 Rehnquist explained: “To conclude 
otherwise would all but paralyze our system for enforcement of 
the criminal law.”168 
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court acknowledged that federal 
habeas law does not “cast[] a blind eye toward innocence” and 
that “a proper showing of actual innocence” could serve as “a 
gateway through which a habeas petitioner [could] pass to have 
his otherwise barred constitutional claim considered on the 
merits.”169 Herrera had no separate constitutional claim to save, 
so his bare innocence claim was not cognizable.170 
                                                                                                     
 163. Id. 
 164. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 400 (1993). 
 165. Id. at 399–400. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. at 398–99. See U.S. v. Lutwak, 344 U.S. 604, 619 (1953) (“A 
defendant is entitled to a fair trial but not a perfect one.”). 
 168. Herrera, 506 U.S. at 399. 
 169. Id. at 404. 
 170. Id. at 404–05 (holding that the gateway exception was “inapplicable 
here,” because Herrera did “not seek excusal of a procedural error so that he 
may bring an independent constitutional claim challenging his conviction or 
sentence”). 
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Subsequently, in Schlup v. Delo,171 the Supreme Court 
addressed the case of a prisoner not bringing a bare innocence 
claim, like Herrera, but one attempting to use his innocence 
claim as a gateway to allow consideration of his otherwise 
procedurally-barred substantive constitutional claims.172 It is 
important, here, to recognize the difference between the type of 
relief Schlup was seeking and the type of relief Herrera had 
sought. Someone bringing a bare innocence claim, like Herrera, 
seeks a court finding that he is actually innocent, while someone 
bringing a gateway claim, like Schlup, seeks a court finding that 
his showing of innocence is strong enough to overcome the 
otherwise-applicable bars to consideration of his substantive 
claims of constitutional violations at his original trial.173  
The Supreme Court recognized that, “importantly, a court’s 
assumptions about the validity of the proceedings that resulted in 
conviction are fundamentally different in Schlup’s case than in 
Herrera’s.”174 A prisoner’s bare innocence claim is “evaluated on 
the assumption that the trial that resulted in his conviction had 
been error free,” while a prisoner’s gateway innocence claim is 
accompanied by claims that his trial was tainted by 
constitutional violations.175 Thus, while a bare innocence 
claimant would have to show “evidence of innocence . . . strong 
enough to make his execution ‘constitutionally intolerable’ even if 
his conviction was the product of a fair trial,”176 a gateway 
innocence claimant only had to show “evidence of innocence so 
strong that a court cannot have confidence in the outcome of the 
trial unless the court is also satisfied that the trial was free of 
nonharmless constitutional error.”177 Because a bare innocence 
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claimant concedes that his trial was fair—he merely asserts that 
new evidence exists casting doubt on its result—the courts 
require a higher threshold before re-examining the guilty verdict 
reached at his admittedly-fair trial. But because a gateway 
innocence claimant is also casting doubt on the fairness of the 
trial that produced his original guilty verdict, his evidence “must 
[only] establish sufficient doubt about his guilt to justify the 
conclusion that his execution would be a miscarriage of justice 
unless his conviction was the product of a fair trial.”178 
The Supreme Court held that a prisoner asserting a gateway 
innocence claim “must show that it is more likely than not that 
no reasonable juror would have convicted him in light of the new 
evidence.”179 Unlike the applicable standard of review for 
challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence in a prisoner’s direct 
appeal, because the courts will necessarily be considering 
evidence that was never presented to a jury, “the inquiry requires 
the federal court to assess how reasonable jurors would react to 
the overall, newly supplemented record,” and this “may include 
consideration of the credibility of the witnesses presented at 
trial.”180 
The Supreme Court emphasized that the threshold for 
establishing a gateway innocence claim is intended to be high and 
should only be met in a case that “is truly extraordinary.”181 By 
comparison, while recognizing that a bare innocence claim is 
hypothetically possible, the Supreme Court has yet to ever find a 
case compelling enough to meet that even higher threshold.182 
Displaying a Talmudic approach to discerning the unresolved 
threshold for as-yet hypothetical bare innocence claims, the 
Supreme Court reasoned: “The sequence of the Court’s decisions 
in Herrera and Schlup—first leaving unresolved the status of 
freestanding claims and then establishing the gateway 
                                                                                                     
 178. Id.  
 179. Id. at 327. 
 180. House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 538–39 (2006). 
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 182. See House, 547 U.S. at 555 (“We conclude here, much as in Herrera, 
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standard—implies at the least that Herrera requires more 
convincing proof of innocence than Schlup.”183 
The American legal system recognizes the need to balance 
the accuracy of its results with the finality of its decisions. 
Defendants are accorded significant constitutional protections 
before they can be deemed guilty in the first instance.184 Even 
after they are adjudged guilty, prisoners have the ability to 
challenge their convictions through the direct appeal process and 
even thereafter through collateral review.185 Every step further 
away from the trial courthouse, however, comes with a narrowing 
of the defendant’s ability to have the question of his guilt re-
examined. His presumption of innocence disappears the moment 
the trial jury finds him guilty. The judges who consider first his 
post-verdict motions, then his appeal, and ultimately his habeas 
petitions will grant increasing amounts of deference to the 
decisions that preceded their review of a case. This is not because 
the courts are blind to the possibility that an innocent man may 
be approaching execution. The courts’ difficulty comes in the fact 
that a person who has exhausted his direct and collateral review 
mechanisms appears in court as a guilty man, not as an innocent 
man. Claims once heard, may not be heard again. Claims that are 
procedurally-barred may never be heard at all. To the frustrated 
prisoner, there may be none so deaf as those that will not hear.186 
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IV. The Thousand-Year Debate About Finality in Criminal Justice 
A. Rav Acha Bar Huna Debates Rav Sheishess 
The rabbis of the Talmud considered the question of finality, 
too, and in true Talmudic fashion, they considered the case of a 
dissenting judge who has something to say, but cannot speak. 
The Mishnah provides that “[i]f someone says: I have 
grounds to argue for [the condemned person’s] acquittal,” a man 
on horseback “races to the execution party and halts them.”187 
Rashi states that this procedure applies if one of the judges has a 
new argument to present that could alter the verdict, but 
commentary suggests that the same rule applies if someone who 
is not a judge has new evidence to present.188 
In the Gemara, Rav Acha bar Huna posed the question:  
If one of the disciples said, ‘I have grounds to argue for [the 
defendant’s] acquittal, but then, before he could advance his 
argument, he was struck mute, and the judges were thus 
prevented from hearing his line of reasoning, what is the law? 
Do we simply disregard the fact that this disciple ever came 
forward, or do we instead rule that the case must be retried 
before a different panel of judges?189  
Commentary explains that a different panel of judges is 
suggested, instead of having the original panel of judges rehear 
the case, because whatever line of reasoning the mute disciple 
wished to raise had already eluded the first set of judges.190 A 
new panel of judges, through their own, fresh analysis of the case, 
might discover the mute disciple’s argument.191 
The Talmud states that Rav Sheishess “blew on his 
hands,”192 before responding:  
                                                                                                     
 187. Sanhedrin 42b. 
 188. Sanhedrin 42b Schottenstein Edition n.6. 
 189. Sanhedrin 43a. 
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If you are prepared to dismiss the case simply because [this 
disciple] was struck mute, then by the same token, you would 
also have to dismiss any capital case ever tried; for perhaps 
someone at the far end of the world might know of an 
argument for acquittal of which the court is not aware!193 
Rav Sheishess’s opinion did not hold sway, however. The 
Gemara explains that in Rav Sheishess’s hypothetical reference 
to an argument possibly awaiting the court at the far end of the 
world, “no one has actually come forward and said that he has 
reason to believe the condemned man is innocent.”194 Whereas in 
Rav Acha bar Huna’s hypothetical case, the now-mute disciple (a 
disciple who immediately dies or for whatever reason cannot 
state his argument) “has come forward and said this; he has 
merely not had a chance to present his line of reasoning.”195 
The Gemara noted the teaching of Rav Yose Bar Chanina 
that “[i]f one of the disciples argued for acquittal and then died, 
we view him as if he were still alive, maintaining his position for 
acquittal.”196 This could have implied that only if the disciple 
actually makes his argument before dying is his stance in favor of 
acquittal to be counted, “but when he never declares his 
argument for acquittal—as, for instance, in our case where he is 
struck mute—in such case, there is no significance to his words 
whatsoever.”197 The Gemara “rejects this inference,” presuming 
that Rav Acha would respond:  
If the disciple declared his argument for acquittal, it is obvious 
to me that his words are to be reckoned with. The question you 
should have is whether the proceedings are affected when he 
said that he can argue for acquittal but died (or was struck 
mute) before doing so.198  
As is often the case, the Gemara does not provide a definitive 
answer.199 The text leaves it unclear whether the example of “a 
disciple who declared his argument for acquittal before being 
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incapacitated” was cited “because this is the only case in which 
his words are still reckoned with” or whether this example was 
cited “merely because it is the more common” case.200 Rashi 
suggests that if the latter view is correct, then Rav Yose “holds 
that it is not crucial for the disciple to actually articulate his 
argument; it is enough if he merely says that he knows of such an 
argument.”201  
Conceding that “[i]t is certainly unusual that [the disciple] 
should be incapacitated at precisely that moment” when he is 
attempting to raise a new argument for the condemned person’s 
acquittal,202 the Talmud nonetheless considers the implications of 
such a scenario. As commentary explains, “we must be concerned 
that the disciple was about to make a substantive argument that 
might have altered the verdict.”203 Rashi holds: “If we are indeed 
concerned for this possibility, we must dismiss the current 
proceedings, and convene a new set of judges to retry the case.”204  
Rashi essentially asserted that a system that refuses to 
execute an even-possibly innocent person cannot impose finality 
in its decisions. The court could not reach a final determination of 
guilt if additional arguments still existed somewhere. 
B. Rabbi Scalia Debates Rabbi Stevens 
More than one thousand years after Rav Acha bar Huna and 
Rav Sheishess debated whether a condemned man should be 
allowed another trip to the courthouse, based on a new—but 
unstated—argument for acquittal, Justice John Paul Stevens and 
Justice Antonin Scalia continued their debate, in the case of Troy 
Davis.205 Davis’s story began twenty years earlier. 
A Georgia court convicted and sentenced Davis to death for 
the 1989 murder of Savannah police officer Mark Allen 
MacPhail.206 In his direct appeal, the Supreme Court of Georgia 
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affirmed Davis’s conviction and death sentence, and the United 
States Supreme Court denied certiorari review.207 In subsequent 
collateral review proceedings, the Georgia trial court denied 
Davis’s state habeas corpus petition, the Supreme Court of 
Georgia affirmed the denial of Davis’s petition, and the United 
States Supreme Court denied certiorari review of the Supreme 
Court of Georgia’s decision.208  
In Davis’s first federal habeas petition, he raised several 
claims asserting violations of his constitutional rights in the 
course of his original trial.209 Because he had failed to raise these 
claims in earlier proceedings, Davis asserted a gateway innocence 
claim—arguing “that his constitutional claims of an unfair trial 
must be considered, even though they are otherwise procedurally 
defaulted, because he has made the requisite showing of actual 
innocence under Schlup.”210 Although Davis complained on 
appeal that the federal trial court did not adequately address the 
merits of his gateway innocence claim, he conceded that it 
nonetheless went on to address and reject the merits of his 
constitutional claims.211 The United States Court of Appeals for 
the Eleventh Circuit likewise failed to find error in the district 
court’s conclusion “that Davis has not borne his burden to 
establish a viable claim that his trial was constitutionally unfair,” 
and it affirmed the denial of Davis’s habeas petition.212 
Davis subsequently presented new evidence to the state trial 
court in an “extraordinary motion for new trial,” pursuant to 
Georgia law.213 The state trial court denied Davis’s motion after it 
“exhaustively reviewed each submitted affidavit and considered 
in great detail the relevant trial testimony, if any, corresponding 
                                                                                                     
conviction and sentence). 
 207. Id., cert. denied, 510 U.S. 950 (1993). 
 208. Davis v. Turpin, 539 S.E.2d 129 (Ga. 2000), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 842 
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to each.”214 Davis’s further attempts to seek relief from the 
Georgia courts and State Board of Pardons and Paroles were 
unsuccessful.215 The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the 
lower court’s denial of Davis’s motion, despite a “painstaking[]” 
review of Davis’s proffered evidence, concluding that it “simply 
cannot disregard the jury’s verdict in this case.”216 Thereafter, the 
Georgia State Board of Pardons and Paroles issued an unusual 
statement, saying that “[a]fter an exhaustive review of all 
available information regarding the Troy Davis case and after 
considering all possible reasons for granting clemency, [it] 
determined that clemency is not warranted.”217 Ultimately, the 
federal court of appeals rejected Davis’s application for 
permission to file a second federal habeas petition, holding that 
“Davis has completely failed to meet the procedural requirements 
of § 2244(b)(2).”218 
While only the jury at Davis’s original trial expressly 
addressed the question of whether Troy Davis was proven guilty 
of the murder of Officer MacPhail beyond a reasonable doubt, 
multiple state and federal courts determined that Davis’s trial 
was fair and constitutional.219 Davis still had various 
opportunities to present his new evidence purporting to establish 
his innocence, but the judges and state officials considering 
Davis’s claims viewed his claims through their deference to “the 
jury [that] had the benefit of hearing from witnesses and 
investigators close to the time of the murder.”220 By the time Troy 
Davis’s case came back to the United States Supreme Court on 
the question of whether he was entitled to a new evidentiary 
hearing on the question of his guilt, the American judicial system 
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had determined that he was guilty, that he had been accorded a 
fair and constitutionally-valid trial and appellate process, and 
that his new claims of innocence were unpersuasive. 
Nevertheless, on Davis’s motion citing the Supreme Court’s 
original jurisdiction to grant a writ of habeas corpus,221 the 
Supreme Court ordered that Davis’s case be returned to a 
Georgia federal courthouse, and remanded the matter to the trial 
court to “receive testimony and make findings of fact as to 
whether evidence that could not have been obtained at the time of 
trial clearly establishes petitioner’s innocence.”222  
Justice Scalia, writing for himself and Justice Thomas, 
argued that the Court was wasting everybody’s time. “Eighteen 
years ago, after a trial untainted by constitutional defect, a 
unanimous jury found petitioner Troy Anthony Davis guilty of 
the murder of Mark Allen MacPhail.”223 Now, here was the Court 
instructing the district court to adjudicate Davis’s habeas petition 
“even though every judicial and executive body that has 
examined petitioner’s stale claim of innocence has been 
unpersuaded.”224  
In his most controversial assertion,225 Justice Scalia wrote 
that the Supreme Court “has never held that the Constitution 
forbids the execution of a convicted defendant who has had a full 
and fair trial but is later able to convince a habeas court that he 
is ‘actually’ innocent.”226 Many of Justice Scalia’s critics 
misconstrue this as a statement that the Constitution would 
allow the execution of an innocent person. Those critics are 
missing his point. Justice Scalia did not say the Constitution 
allows the execution of a prisoner who is actually innocent.  
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The Torah may teach: “An innocent person you shall not 
slay.”227 Justice Scalia does not consider Davis to be an innocent 
person. He considers Davis to be a convicted murderer. He is 
guilty. It has been determined. 
Justice Stevens, writing for himself, Justice Ginsburg, and 
Justice Breyer, issued an opinion concurring with the Supreme 
Court’s order, responding to the arguments raised in Justice 
Scalia’s dissent from the Court’s action.228 Justice Stevens scoffed 
that Justice Scalia “assume[d] as a matter of fact that petitioner 
Davis is guilty of the murder of Officer MacPhail.”229 But Justice 
Scalia did not assume Davis’s guilt. Justice Scalia took notice of 
the trial court’s adjudication of Davis’s guilt and the fact that no 
subsequent review of his trial in direct or collateral proceedings 
found any constitutional defects in Davis’s trial.230 Justice Scalia 
took Davis’s guilt as an established fact because it had been 
established at Davis’s trial. 
The Justices also disagreed about whether the federal courts 
would have the authority to offer Davis any relief. AEDPA bars 
relief to a state prisoner whose claim had been adjudicated by the 
state courts on the merits, unless the state adjudication “resulted 
in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable 
application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by 
the Supreme Court of the United States.”231 Justice Stevens 
argued that neither Congress nor the Constitution would 
countenance an application of AEDPA’s procedural bars that 
would allow the execution of a person with “even the most robust 
showing of actual innocence” but precluded from relief due to 
“minor procedural error.”232  
In a scene reminiscent of the Gemara, Rabbi Stevens posed 
this Talmudic hypothetical: 
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[I]magine a petitioner in Davis’s situation who possesses new 
evidence conclusively and definitively proving, beyond any 
scintilla of doubt, that he is an innocent man. The dissent’s 
reasoning would allow such a petitioner to be put to death 
nonetheless.233 
One can almost picture Rabbi Scalia blowing on his hands in 
scorn234 as he responded: 
There is no sound basis for distinguishing an actual-innocence 
claim from any other claim that is alleged to have produced a 
wrongful conviction. If the District Court here can ignore 
§ 2254(d)(1) on the theory that otherwise Davis’s actual-
innocence claim would (unconstitutionally) go unaddressed, 
the same possibility would exist for any claim going beyond 
clearly established Federal law.235 
Justice Scalia characterized the Supreme Court’s action as 
depending on the idea “that capital convictions obtained in full 
compliance with law can never be final.”236 He should have 
quoted Rav Sheishess. Perhaps someone at the far end of the 
world might know of an argument of which the trial and 
reviewing courts were not aware. 
The real difference of opinion between Justice Stevens and 
Justice Scalia was not whether Troy Davis was innocent or guilty, 
but what it means to be innocent or guilty. As the Talmud might 
ask, what is the essence of innocence? The real debate between 
the Justices was whether guilt is a decision made once, in a full 
and fair trial, ensured by a thorough appellate process reviewing 
the manner in which that decision was made, or whether guilt is 
a question that remains unresolved until all possible innocence 
claims are heard and disposed of, even claims residing at the far 
end of the world. What are the Justices doing if not “asking about 
[the] definition[] and essence[]” of guilt?237 
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The problem the Supreme Court wrestled with—and 
continues to wrestle with238—is how a criminal justice system 
designed and operated by fallible human beings comes to a 
definitive conclusion about a defendant’s guilt. If Justice Stevens 
is correct that guilt is an objective state of being, then Troy 
Davis’s claim must be heard. No court can come to a final, 
objective decision resolving the question of Davis’s guilt. Someone 
can always come up with a new argument, and Davis should be 
returned to the courthouse to have the argument heard. If Justice 
Scalia is correct that guilt is a legal a conclusion, then Davis has 
already had his claim heard. The trial court determined that 
Davis was guilty, and subsequent examinations of Davis’s trial in 
his direct and collateral appeals have ensured that Davis’s trial 
was fair and free of constitutional errors.239 Justice Stevens 
wanted the courts to ensure that an innocent man was not 
executed. Justice Scalia believed the courts already had. 
V. The Fate of Troy Davis  
What do we know about Troy Davis’s guilt or innocence? 
None of us—author or readers—have observed the witnesses or 
heard the evidence presented to establish his guilt. It is not this 
Article’s purpose to present that evidence, for it is not our 
prerogative now to decide whether Troy Davis shot and killed 
Officer MacPhail. What we know is that numerous courts 
reviewed Davis’s original trial and determined that it was free of 
constitutional defects.240 As far as the American legal system is 
concerned, Troy Davis was convicted by a jury of his peers in 
accordance with due process of law. We must acknowledge, 
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however, that this does not attest to the metaphysical accuracy of 
the result reached in those proceedings.  
But Troy Davis received something more—something almost 
no convicted defendant in America receives—an evidentiary 
hearing to present new evidence challenging his guilt after he 
had exhausted all usual avenues of appeal and collateral review. 
While Justice Scalia and Justice Stevens debated the 
philosophical meanings of guilt and finality, the Supreme Court 
ordered Davis’s case transferred back to the federal trial court to 
determine “whether evidence that could not have been obtained 
at the time of trial clearly establishes [Davis’s] innocence.”241 The 
flag was waved and Davis was turned around to go back before 
the tribunal to reconsider the question of his guilt. 
The district court heard Davis’s new evidentiary claims and 
rejected his actual innocence argument.242 The district court 
began its seventy-page decision with a twelve-page review of the 
evidence marshalled in the original investigation,243 a five-page 
review of Davis’s probable cause hearing,244 a seventeen-page 
review of the evidence presented at Davis’s trial,245 and a two-
page review of Davis’s motions for post-trial relief.246 Then, after 
reviewing the evidentiary standards for establishing a claim of 
actual innocence, the district court reviewed for twelve pages the 
subsequent evidence purportedly calling Davis’s guilt into doubt, 
including witness recantations247 and evidence proffered to 
directly establish Davis’s innocence.248  
After hearing and considering Davis’s new evidence, the 
district court concluded “that while executing an innocent person 
would violate the United States Constitution, Mr. Davis has 
failed to prove his innocence.”249 To Davis’s argument that his 
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case “involves credible, consistent recantations by seven of the 
nine state witnesses,”250 the district court responded:  
Two of the recanting witnesses neither directly state that they 
lied at trial nor claim that their previous testimony was 
coerced. . . . Two other recantations were impossible to believe, 
with a host of intrinsic reasons why their author’s recantation 
could not be trusted, and the recantations were contradicted 
by credible, live testimony. . . . Two more recantations were 
intentionally and suspiciously offered in affidavit form rather 
than as live testimony, blocking any meaningful cross-
examination by the state or credibility determination by this 
Court. . . . Moreover, these affidavit recantations were 
contradicted by credible, live testimony.251 
The district court did credit the recantation offered by one 
witness. However, in light of the fact that it considered his 
original trial testimony “patently false, as evidenced by its 
several inconsistencies with the State’s version of the events on 
the night in question,” the district court did not believe his 
testimony was “important to the conviction,” thus “rendering his 
recantation of limited value.”252 
As to the affirmative evidence purporting to bolster Davis’s 
innocence claim, the district court stated that Davis had “vastly 
overstate[d] the value of his evidence of innocence.”253 The district 
court found that a witness who identified a different shooter was 
“not credible.”254 It deemed an uncorroborated hearsay 
confession, testified to by several witnesses, to be untrustworthy, 
noting that even one of the witnesses who recounted the 
confession doubted its truth.255 The district court did not consider 
the other proffered evidence to be exculpatory or relevant to 
Davis’s conviction and considered much of it to be “too general to 
provide anything more than smoke and mirrors.”256 
Given the procedural history of every adjudication that had 
been made before, the district court noted that “[t]he burden was 
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on Mr. Davis to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that no 
reasonable juror would have convicted him in light of the new 
evidence.”257 One need not engage in a Talmudic digression by 
elaborating on the factual merits of the case for or against Troy 
Davis. Suffice it to say that the district court tasked with 
considering Davis’s new factual claims compared the original 
evidence used to establish his guilt at trial with the new evidence 
presented on Davis’s behalf and concluded that “Mr. Davis’s new 
evidence does not change the balance of proof from trial.”258 The 
district court explained: “Ultimately, while Mr. Davis’s new 
evidence casts some additional, minimal doubt on his conviction, 
it is largely smoke and mirrors. The vast majority of the evidence 
at trial remains intact, and the new evidence is largely not 
credible or lacking in probative value.”259 The district court 
concluded: “[T]he evidence produced at the hearing on the merits 
of Mr. Davis’s claim of actual innocence and a complete review of 
the record . . . does not require the reversal of the jury’s judgment 
that Troy Anthony Davis murdered City of Savannah Police 
Officer Mark Allen MacPhail on August 19, 1989.”260 
The district court asserted: “If there is a principle more 
firmly embedded in the fabric of the American legal system than 
that which proscribes punishment of the innocent, it is unknown 
to this Court.”261 It claimed to find such a principle enshrined in 
the United States Constitution, “including,” but presumably not 
limited to, “the Eighth Amendment” and its prohibition of “cruel 
and unusual punishments.”262 The district court’s faith in the 
purported principle against punishing the “innocent” can only be 
understood within the American legal system’s reliance on 
finality. The district court acknowledged that “Mr. Davis’s guilt 
was proven at trial beyond a reasonable doubt, but not to a 
mathematical certainty.”263 And yet, Troy Davis could be 
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executed, because he was not innocent. He was guilty. It had been 
determined.  
A little over a year later, the New York Times reported: 
“Proclaiming his innocence, Troy Davis was put to death by lethal 
injection on [September 21, 2011], his life—and the hopes of 
supporters worldwide—prolonged by several hours while the 
Supreme Court reviewed but then declined to act on a petition 
from his lawyers to stay the execution.”264 As far as the American 
courts were concerned, the matter was closed. No petition from 
the far end of the world would be heard. 
VI. Conclusion 
The rabbis of the Talmud were inspired by a “fierce urge to 
arrive at the absolute truth.”265 Yet, they also recognized: “If You 
seek to have a world, strict justice cannot be exercised; and if You 
seek strict justice, there will be no world. . . . If You do not relent 
a little, the world will not endure.”266 Even divine justice is 
imperfect, recognizing that “there are those who are swept away 
without justice.”267 While Jewish tradition holds that G-d’s 
presence is found in a court’s judgment, this can be conceived of 
in many ways. One can believe “that every judgment that is 
decided by a legitimate judge is divine regardless of its content,” 
or one can believe that “only true judgment” is divine and a 
judgment’s divinity “depends on its content and on its 
truthfulness.”268 
In the American legal system, appellate courts do not exist to 
ensure certain discovery of the truth. Appellate courts exist to 
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ensure that we seek the truth through a fair trial. Accuracy is 
balanced with finality, but this is not finality for its own sake. It 
is not simply that we must bring litigation to an end; it is the 
belief that accuracy is best achieved through a fair process, not by 
repetition. We do not believe that a best two-out-of-three trial 
system would be any more accurate than one fair trial ensured 
through appellate review. If you ask me whether Troy Davis was 
guilty, I would ask you why my answer would be any more 
reliable than the trial judge who heard the new evidence. We can 
recognize the moral necessity of holding open the courthouse 
doors for an actual innocence claim, while understanding that 
someone still has to make a decision as to whether the defendant 
met his burden to establish his innocence claim.  
Yet we must also acknowledge that metaphysical truth is 
impossible to achieve in any human-designed and 
human-managed system. This does not relieve the courts of their 
responsibility to be part of the search for truth. Acceptance and 
recognition of the fact that metaphysical certainty is not possible 
should ensure that appellate judges stay mindful of their 
responsibility to oversee the safeguards in the system through 
which we strive towards the truth. 
“Tzedek, tzedek tirdof.”269 “Justice, justice shall you seek.” 
Seek, not find. The American legal system seeks justice—a justice 
that lies somewhere between accuracy and finality. 
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